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FILED
Pat Bartholomew
Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court
450 South State Street, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854

OCT 0 5 2004

Rz:$tate v. Arthur Anthony Gonzales, Case # 20020935

Dear Ms. Bartholomew:
Based on Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(i), I wish to clarify a concern that some of the
justices of the Utah Supreme Court expressed yesterday at oral argument in the case listed above.
Specifically, some justices asked why neither of the defense attorneys below re-issued a
subpoena for the contested psychological records. I argued that Judge McCleve's ruling
foreclosed any further requests for in camera review of the psychological records.
In her memorandum decision, Judge McCleve ruled that because she believed that defense
counsel obtained the psychological records in bad faith, sanctions were warranted. See Record
on Appeal ("R.") at 264-66; Addendum. Accordingly, she ordered "that the information so
obtained by subpoena may not be used at trial and the defense counsel will write an apology to
the victim for having inappropriately obtained it." R. at 266.

I hope that this passage clarifies any confusion over trial counsels' actions. Should this Court
have any further concerns or questions, I would be happy to assist the Court in any way.

Sincerely,

Kent R. Hart

cc:

Marian Decker, Assistant Utah Attorney General
Gregory Skordas, Jack M. Morgan, Jr., Liani Jeanheh, and Douglas Beloof, attorneys for
amicus curiae
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any contact with the victim's family to be arranged through the
District Attorney's Office*
In April, two subpoenas were issued to mental health providers
without

copies

prosecution.

provided

to

the

victim,

her

guardian

or

the

Defense counsel had also obtained mental health

records of the victim from University Neuropsychiatric Institute
("UNI") by subpoena, again without sending copies to the victim or
the opposing party.
Defense counsel obtained the records from UNI pursuant to a
signed,

notarized

Affidavit

executed

by defense

counsel which

stated that the victim had placed her mental and physical health at
issue in a case.

After complying with the subpoena, UNI informed

defense counsel that the records had been given to him in error.
At

the

time

of

UNI's

acknowledgment

of

error,

the

Assistant

District Attorney was not made aware by defense counsel of the
claim of error.
attention

The prosecution did discover and bring to the

of the Court

on April

8ch that defense

counsel

had

obtained and kept the records.
Defense counsel did not inform the Court of the claim of
error, did not return the documents of UNI and did not turn the
documents over to the Court until the Court ordered him to do so on
April 8th.
records

and

At that time, defense counsel willingly supplied the
freely

admitted

he

had

already

read,

marked

and
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from the records

representation of the defendant.

in preparation

for his

Defense counsel believed that

although he had full access to the records, the defendant himself
had had limited access to the information his lawyer obtained.
The information which defense counsel has with respect to
treatment

providers

and

any

conditions

from which

the

victim

previously suffered comes directly from these medical records.
Since April 8th' the medical records have been kept under seal
and reviewed only by the Court.
Though it may be proper for the Court to review in camera

the

alleged victim's medical records without her waiver of privilege,
there is no law, even where an exception to privilege allows a
defendant access to otherwise confidential records, that gives a
defendant the right to examine all of the confidential information
or search through files without supervision.
In this case, defense counsel, without Court knowledge or
approval, obtained

confidential

medical

records claimed

to be

supplied in error and then defense counsel studied them in aid of
preparation for his case.
It certainly

is reasonable to conclude that the defendant

would also have to be informed regarding the information in order
to participate in his own defense.

Further, it is impossible to

divorce defense counsel's knowledge obtained from the privileged

STATE V. GONZALES
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from his knowledge of the rest of the case or to

determine or monitor how that knowledge of privileged information
has affected the strategy and knowledge of the rest of the case.
Additionally, defense counsel obtained the medical records by
representing that the victim/patient had "placed mental or physical
condition at issue as a claim or defense in a lawsuit
added). M

(emphasis

Nothing factually supports this representation.

The

patient is the alleged victim of the crime, not a party raising a
claim or defense.
information

for

Rather,

possible

it is the defendant who seeks the

impeachment

purposes

in

aid

of

his

defense.
To interpret the language relied upon by defendant
Affidavit

to

mean

that

such

privileged

information

in the

could

be

intended to be obtained for possible purposes of impeachment as
part of a "defense," without anything factually

in support of

piercing the privilege, would eliminate the privilege altogether
since

any

defense,

indeed

impeachment of any witness.

any

case,

always

allows

possible

The language upon which defendant

relies on its face and by its plain meaning in the context of the
phrase cannot be so broadly read.

The patient must "place mental

or physical condition at issue as a claim or defense in a lawsuit."
Merely by being required to take the stand as a witness, the victim
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has not placed her mental condition at issue as a claim or defense
in a lawsuit.
Having

obtained

access

to

very

personal

and

possibly

embarrassing information about the victim/ the defendant asserts
but has not shown that the victim is "an emotionally unstable and
troubled

young

girl

who

is

pathologically

dishonest

and

manipulative who fabricated her story in order to prevent her
mother from marrying Mr. Gonzales."

But whether that assertion

could justify an order requiring health care providers to submit
privileged records to the Court for an in camera
impeachment is not the issue here.

review in aid of

That issue was not timely or

appropriately brought to the Court.
The facts here are that defendant, by subpoena, erroneously
(plaintiff

asserts

deceptively)

obtained,

and

UNI

erroneously

provided, privileged information without waiver of privilege.

And

most importantly, once error in providing privileged information
was asserted by UNI, defense counsel did not immediately submit the
records to the Court to be kept under seal until the issue of error
could be determined.

Instead, he maintained and studied them until

the prosecution's Motion to Quash came before the Court.
If the defendant relies on State v. Cardall, 982 P.2d 79 (Utah
1999) , as the basis for his right to access to victim's records, as
it appears he does, then he must also accept that the determination
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of privileged records' discoverability, according to that case, was
to have been determined by the Court's in camera

review before he

could have acquired access to their contents. Accordingly, in this
case at the service of the subpoena he could have directed the
recipients of the subpoenas to turn over the records under seal to
the Court before he read and studied them.
Certainly,

defense

counsel

knew

the

privilege

existed.

Certainly he knew that the prosecution claimed the privilege and
would strongly oppose any exception to be taken to it.

Certainly

he knew, as well, that UNI asserted error in having complied with
defendant's

subpoena.

And

before

he

issued

the

subpoenas,

certainly he knew or should have known, that without waiver of
privilege, the Cardall case implied and required Court scrutiny of
the information sought prior to piercing the privilege.

Finally,

how could counsel not have known or realized that once he had
obtained and reviewed the privileged information it would become
impossible

to

remove

the

taint

of

that

knowledge

from

his

representation in the case?
Clearly, the Motion to Quash the subpoenas must be granted.
Even

assuming

the

defendant's

erroneous

interpretation

(that

victim's mental state is an element of a claim or defense in the
criminal trial) is a good faith interpretation of law, still he
evidences a suggestion of a lack of good faith here by having
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reviewed the privileged information prior to Court scrutiny.

This

conclusion is supported by the fact that he relies upon the Cardall
case to claim access to the records which itself also prerequisites
Court scrutiny prior to access.
As

sanctions,

the

Court

orders

that

the

information

so

obtained by subpoena may not be used at trial and the defense
counsel

will

write

an

apology

to

the

victim

for

having

inappropriately obtained it.
Despite his good character and reputation, by having obtained
knowledge

of

the witness which cannot now be erased,

defense

counsel has inserted a question whether the trial can be a fair one
which is not able to be resolved.

Of equal concern, by tainting

his

irretractable,

knowledge

of

the

case

with

impermissible,

privileged information about the witness, counsel appears to have
created a conflict that calls into question the professional ethics
of his continued representation of the defendant.
Dated this / T d a v of June, 2002.

^_ ^

. <7"*>I~" A^''r

<^^SHEILA K. MCCTEVE
\> '.. <
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE \ ^ 6;?r*TS of VK<\r.

